Term Limits and the Political Class

Will They Actually Get Rid of Those People?

The geriatric generation running Congress is a walking advertisement for term limits.

“Term limits in Congress” is having one of its moments.

What is “The Political Class”

I think when people call for term limits for Congress, they really mean, “Let’s get rid of all these DC swamp dwellers and the Uniparty, and put normal folks in there. We’ll be like the ancient Athenians, who selected citizens at random to serve one year, and that’s it.”

This is a wonderful goal. We’ve had term limits in California since 1990, and lots of other states have them too. The problem is, there is no term limit on membership in The Political Class. A termed-out legislator just changes to a different chair in the room; he or she doesn’t leave the room and go back out on the street.

This article focuses on California, since it’s the biggest state and also where I live. For further study: other states with term limits.

You hate AI. I get it. I looked for an non-AI explanation as good and concise as ChatGPT’s, but couldn’t find one. Especially, most of the uses of the term seem to be British. It hasn’t caught on as much in the U.S. So here it is, and I promise it’ll be my last use of AI:

When people refer to "the political class," they usually mean a relatively small, elite group of people who are professionally involved in politics, policymaking, and government. This includes:

• Elected officials (e.g., senators, representatives, mayors)

• Political appointees (e.g., cabinet members, advisors)

• High-level bureaucrats in government agencies

• Political consultants, strategists, and lobbyists

• Think tank members, policy analysts, and political journalists (sometimes)

The term is often used critically or cynically, suggesting that this group is:

• Detached from ordinary citizens’ lives or concerns

• More loyal to each other or to institutions of power than to the general public

• Involved in self-serving behavior, such as preserving their influence, wealth, or status

It’s associated with the idea of an insider group that runs the system, often regardless of which party is in power. In that sense, "the political class" can imply a kind of informal ruling class distinct from voters or regular citizens.

This is not quite the same as “the swamp” but it’s a subset of it.

Term Limits are Symbolic

Senators’ and Representatives’ terms are set by the Constitution, so no state can limit them. But they’re free to do so for state and local officials, and many have. None of these “term limits for Congress” people ever bother to look at how term limits have actually worked.

California has had term limits for state legislators since 1990, when voters passed Proposition 140. That limited Assembly members to three 2-year terms, and Senate members to two 4-year terms. In 2012, these restrictions were loosened, so that lawmakers could serve a total of 12 years in the legislature, in either or both houses.

We won’t even consider the political results. Does anyone seriously want to argue that California has improved since 1990? Let’s just look at the purported benefits for the legislative process versus the actual ones.

Who’s Against Term Limits?

The absolute best argument for term limits is their opponents: I think “grifters” is a pretty good blanket term. If the Political Class is against them, it’s a safe bet that you should be for them.

From the Cato organization’s analysis:

Term limits continue to be opposed by a majority of politicians and by a majority of the legislative staff, bureaucrats, journalists, and interest groups that depend on politicians for employment, patronage, sources, and votes. Interest groups (especially large, heavily regulated corporations as well as unions that rely on government intervention in the labor market) view term limits as anathema to their interests.' A 1990 survey of 302 state legislators found only 41 percent in favor of term limits: Inside the Beltway, the Washington Post regularly editorializes to the effect that "term limits are a terrible idea."' On the West Coast, the San Francisco Chronicle concluded that "term limits at the legislative level have ill-served California."' Yet, despite a steady onslaught of negative commentary emanating from the political and media establishments, public opinion remains solidly in favor of term limits) During last year's elections, local term limits passed in California, Florida, Maryland, and New Mexico, adding to the total of nearly 3,000 municipal offices and more than 17,000 local politicians already subject to term limits.

What Are the Selling Points?

The ideal that term limits strive for is, basically, “citizen legislators,” who have non-public jobs and act as legislators as a form of civic duty, after which they go back to their normal lives. They bring unique perspectives to the legislature since they are not career politicians, and they will have to live under the laws they pass. This is the ancient Greek and Roman ideal (whether or not it was achieved even then).

While legislators are in office, they should be less manipulable by lobbyists and special interests, since they can’t stay forever and accumulate power, like Willie Brown, who essentially ruled California’s State Assembly. It was believed that, without Brown’s support, nothing could pass.

How many Californians could name the Speaker of the Assembly now without consulting Google? I know I can’t. Willie Brown and Jesse Unruh in their day were household names. Is it progress that a lot of people you wouldn’t recognize in the grocery store line are leading the legislature and passing bills?

In addition, since legislators wouldn’t need to constantly raise money for their reelection, they could be more independent and devoted to their own constituents’ and the state’s needs, rather than the party’s and the lobbyists’.

All this sounds wonderful, doesn’t it? That’s why voters usually approve term limits when given the choice, and why there’s now a groundswell to impose them on Congress.

California: The Good Parts

1990 was 35 years ago, more than enough time for scholars to analyze and describe the effects of term limits. Here’s a small sampling:

Incumbents’ Reelection Rates

It’s not a good thing for democracy that, once you’re in office, you can never be turned out. The voters should be examining your performance critically, and either firing or rehiring you at every election.

Cato told us in 2001:

Before term limits: during the California elections of 1984,1986, and 1988, 267 of 270 incumbents successfully sought reelection. In 1988 incumbent state senators had a 100 percent reelection rate, and incumbent members of the state Assembly had a 96 percent reelection rate.

and after 1990:

In 1996, 52 state legislators left office because of term limits; in 1998, more than 200 state legislators were forced to step down. In 2000, 369 state legislators were forced out by term limits. On average, term-limited legislatures have lost a third of their pre–term limits incumbents.

Campaign Expenditures

If an elective office is almost a lifetime sinecure, then it’s worth spending a lot of money to achieve. Imagine how much a serious Republican effort to unseat Chuck Schumer would cost. Or imagine what AOC would spend in a Democratic primary against him. So we’d hope that term limits would make the jobs less valuable and thus require less money to win. Let’s see how that worked out:

California’s legislative term limits have dramatically reduced campaign expenditures. Real expenditures during the three general elections after the term limits initiative passed in 1990 were lower than in even 1976. This drop has occurred at the same time that races have become closer contests and more candidates are running for office. By any measure, term limits have coincided with large changes in the level of political competition, even before term limits have forcibly removed a single politician from office. The changes are so large that more incumbents are being defeated, races are closer, more candidates are running, and fewer single candidate races occur than at any other time during our sample period.

Diverse Backgrounds

Legislators everywhere have tended to be lawyers with political connections, or former legislative staff. It’s a goal of term limits to get more diverse backgrounds in the legislature: people from business, teaching, farming, science, medicine, etc.

Cato tells us:

In California three times more legislators are now businesspeople than were previously. Furthermore, former legislative staffers— a principal source of new legislators in the pre–term limits era—are a small proportion of new legislators. Petracca’s findings are confirmed elsewhere. For example, a Los Angeles Times survey of the 1992 state legislature found a plethora of different occupations represented. Throughout California there has been an increase in the number of candidates from outside the political establishment. However, Jean-Philippe Faletta and colleagues found that the backgrounds of pre– and post–term limits Michigan state legislators were comparable.

The Bad Parts

Undoing It

Naturally, the Political Class couldn’t stand all this, and somehow or other, they got the voters to loosen the reins. The Public Policy Institute of California (not a conservative outlet) tells us:

In 2012, California voters passed Proposition 28, which relaxed term limits by allowing legislators to serve up to 12 years in either or both chambers of the legislature. Under the previous rules, term limits for each chamber required anyone who wanted to spend the maximum 14 years in the legislature to move from one chamber to the other. And because the senate has half as many seats as the assembly, no more than half could serve the full 14 years.

“Turnover” is a big goal of term limits: we want new people and new perspectives, not career legislators. The PPI says,

The impact of Proposition 28 has been significant, particularly in the assembly, where turnover has plummeted from a peak of 50% in the 2012 election to just 8% this cycle—a 30-year low. Senate terms are twice as long as assembly terms and only half of the chamber is up for reelection each cycle, so there is naturally less turnover there. Nonetheless, turnover in the senate shows signs of decline.

Where Do They Come From, and Where Do They Go?

Another big goal of term limits is to “drain the swamp” (although that term isn’t always used). Supporters dream of legislators who are normal people with regular jobs before serving, and after they’ve termed out, they go back to them.

Unfortunately, it hasn’t turned out that way. They are still people from the Political Class, and after they leave the legislature, they stay in it. In another Public Policy Institute paper from 2004, they summarize it as follows:

Today’s members are more likely to come from local government and to run again when termed out.

Furthermore:

For the California term limits movement, the first of many goals was to change the mix of people serving in the state Legislature. Incumbency advantages, proponents argued, had undermined fair elections, preventing regular party turnover and perpetuating the political careers of professional politicians who were increasingly out of touch with the concerns of average Californians. With high name recognition and the ability to raise more money than challengers, incumbents were virtually invulnerable during the 1980s: Reelection rates for Assembly incumbents, for instance, exceeded 90 percent in the decade before Proposition 140. Representatives who retired or ran for higher office were frequently replaced by their own staff members, so that even when the faces changed, legislative perspectives often did not. Limiting Assembly and Senate terms, it was hoped, would increase the rotation into and out of office and change the background and perspectives of those serving in the Legislature.

But no, it’s just made them run for different offices instead of staying in the same one.

In the term limits era, a lengthy political career requires changing offices more frequently. A common career path now is from a local office (e.g., city council, board of supervisors, special district, or school board) to the Assembly, then to the Senate, and finally to higher office or back down to local government. Although few elected officials return to local government, this path is chosen more frequently now than it was before term limits, and the effects of this pattern are potentially important.

To summarize: the term limit initiative did not eliminate the Political Class, or, to put it more bluntly, the grifters. It just forced them to switch jobs more often.

Conclusion: What About Federal Term Limits?

As we saw, California term limits did not produce legislators who are normal people with regular jobs. They still go to Sacramento because they’re members of the Political Class, and they maintain their membership afterwards.

On the balance, term limits were still a good thing and the electorate will never repeal them outright, but the point of this article is to lower your expectations. Imposing term limits on Congress would not make the U.S. into Periclean Athens, or Republican Rome.

At the federal level, the revolving door is even wider. There are many more opportunities to retain your membership in the Political Class without keeping a seat in Congress. The President might appoint you to a Cabinet or sub-Cabinet position. Ivy-league universities can hire you to “teach” (in quotes because you may not even have to teach a class). Non-governmental organizations can hire you. Lobbying or public relations firms can hire you. My own former Congressman, Norman Mineta, resigned to join the public relations firm Hill & Knowlton.

To conclude: sure, let’s have term limits for Congress, but don’t expect it miracles.